Provides an in-depth exploration of ignorance in its many dimensions. Philosophers have long examined epistemological concepts like belief, knowledge, and understanding, but they have paid less attention to ignorance. Rik Peels provides a full-on epistemology of ignorance, and then applies that epistemology to a wide variety of philosophical issues. Among the questions he addresses are: What kinds of ignorance are there? What does ignorance excuse? When is ignorance culpable?
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There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
1. Introduction / Rik Peels -- 2. Ignorance, alternative possibilites, and the epistemic conditions for responsiblity / Carolina Sartorio -- 3. Moral incapacity and moral ignorance / Elinor Mason -- 4. Justification, excuse, and the exculpatory power of ignorance / Marcia Baron -- 5. Ignorance as a moral excuse / Michael J. Zimmerman -- 6. Tracing cases of culpable ignorance / Holly M. Smith -- 7. Is making people ignorant as bad as deceiving them? / Don Fallis -- 8. Radical evaluative ignorance / Martin Peterson -- 9. Living with ignorance in a world of experts / Alexander A. Guerrero -- 10. Risk : knowledge, ignorance, and values combined / Sven Ove Hansson -- 11. Ignorance as a legal excuse / Larry Alexander -- 12. Ignorance, technology, and collective responsibility / Seumas Miller.
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Dit essay reflecteert kritisch op aard en functie van het model van radicale verlossing, de rol daarvan in het verklaren van terrorisme, en de rol van affecten en verlangens daarin.
AbstractIt is widely thought that education should aim at positive epistemic standings, like knowledge, insight, and understanding. In this paper, we argue that, surprisingly, in pursuit of this aim, it is sometimes necessary to also cultivate ignorance. We examine several types of case. First, in various circumstances educators should present students with defeaters for their knowledge, so that they come to lack knowledge, at least temporarily. Second, there is the phenomenon of 'scaffolding' in education, which we note might sometimes involve the educator quite properly ensuring that the student is ignorant of certain kinds of information. Third, if ignorance is lack of true belief, as a number of commentators have claimed, then in those cases in which students believe something truly without knowing it and teachers show that they lack knowledge, students may abandon that belief and thus become ignorant. In examining the role of ignorance in education, we explore exactly which kinds of ignorance are valuable in teaching situations and draw attention to important epistemic differences between ignorance on different levels.
